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This issue features Professor Chalmers Johnson's timely article originally posted at (www.Tomdispatch.com) on July 30, 2009. The text is abridged by about 40 percent with the author's permission. Readers are advised to look up the original text for more complete information and analysis. Professor Johnson, well known throughout academia, needs no introduction: suffice it to note that his trilogy of books on the "Empire of Bases" (see the end notes, p. 5) is a must read 21st-Century classic for all students of current world affairs. We are grateful to Professor Johnson for making this article available for us at a "teachable moment." Inspired by the Johnson paradigm, we try our hand at an interpretation of recent events in an important corner of the U.S. Empire of Bases -- Okinawa -- centering on the Guam International Agreement. (p. 5) For further reading on this and related issues, we recommend recent "Okinawa articles" at *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*" (<http://japanfocus.org>). (p. 8)

Three Good Reasons To Liquidate Our Empire And Ten Steps to Take to Do So

By Chalmers Johnson

However ambitious President Barack Obama's domestic plans, one unacknowledged issue has the potential to destroy any reform efforts he might launch. Think of it as the 800-pound gorilla in the American living room: our longstanding reliance on imperialism and militarism in our relations with other countries and the vast, potentially ruinous global empire of bases that goes with it. The failure to begin to deal with our bloated military establishment and the profligate use of it in missions for which it is hopelessly inappropriate will, sooner rather than later, condemn the United States to a devastating trio of consequences: imperial overstretch, perpetual war, and insolvency, leading to a likely collapse similar to that of the former Soviet Union.

According to the 2008 official Pentagon inventory of our military bases around the world, our empire [consists of](#) 865 facilities in more than 40 countries and overseas U.S. territories. We deploy over 190,000 troops in 46 countries and territories. In just one such country, Japan, at the end of March 2008, we still had 99,295 people connected to U.S. military forces living and working there -- 49,364 members of our armed services, 45,753 dependent family members, and 4,178 civilian employees. Some 13,975 of these were crowded into the small island of Okinawa, the largest concentration of foreign troops anywhere in Japan.

These massive concentrations of American military power outside the United States are not needed for our defense. They are, if anything, a prime contributor to our numerous conflicts with other countries. They are also unimaginably expensive. According to Anita Dancs, an analyst for the website Foreign Policy in Focus, the United States [spends](#) approximately \$250 billion each year maintaining its global military presence. The sole purpose of this is to give us hegemony -- that is, control or dominance -- over as many nations on the planet as possible.

We are like the British at the end of World War II: desperately trying to shore up an empire that we never needed and can no longer afford, using methods that often resemble those of failed empires of the past -- including the Axis powers of World War II and the former Soviet Union. There is an important lesson for us in the British decision, starting in 1945, to liquidate their empire relatively voluntarily, rather than being forced to do so by defeat in war, as were Japan and Germany, or by debilitating colonial conflicts, as were the French and Dutch. We should follow the British example.

Here are three basic reasons why we must liquidate our empire or else watch it liquidate us.

1. We Can No Longer Afford Our Postwar Expansionism

On March 12, 2009, in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington DC, the president again [insisted](#), "Now make no mistake, this nation will maintain our military dominance. We will have the strongest armed forces in the history of the world." And in a commencement address to the cadets of the U.S. Naval Academy on May 22nd, Obama [stressed](#) that "[w]e will maintain America's military dominance and keep you the finest fighting force the world has ever seen."

What he failed to note is that the United States no longer has the capability to remain a global hegemon, and to pretend otherwise is to invite disaster. According to a growing consensus of economists and political scientists around the world, it is impossible for the United States to continue in that role while emerging into full view as a crippled economic power. No such configuration has ever persisted in the history of imperialism. Our unwillingness to retrench, no less liquidate, represents a striking historical failure of the imagination.

In May 2009, the Office of Management and Budget predicted that in 2010 the United States will be burdened with a budget deficit of at least \$1.75 trillion. This includes neither a projected \$640 billion budget for the Pentagon, nor the costs of waging two remarkably expensive wars. The sum is so immense that it will take several generations for American citizens to repay the costs of George W. Bush's imperial adventures -- if they ever can or will. It represents about 13% of our current gross domestic product (that is, the value of everything we produce). It is worth noting that the [target demanded](#) of European nations wanting to join the Euro Zone is a deficit no greater than 3% of GDP.

2. We Are Going to Lose the War in Afghanistan and It Will Help Bankrupt Us

One of our major strategic blunders in Afghanistan was not to have recognized that both Great Britain and the Soviet Union attempted to pacify Afghanistan using the same military methods as ours and failed disastrously. We seem to have learned nothing from Afghanistan's modern history. Between 1849 and 1947, Britain sent almost annual expeditions against the Pashtun tribes and sub-tribes living in what was then called the North-West Frontier Territories -- the area along either side of the artificial border between Afghanistan and Pakistan called the Durand Line. This frontier was created in 1893 by Britain's foreign secretary for India, Sir Mortimer Durand. Neither Britain nor Pakistan has ever managed to establish effective control over the area.

The region known today as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is administered directly by Islamabad, which -- just as British imperial officials did -- has [divided](#) the territory into seven agencies, each with its own "political agent" who wields much the same powers as his colonial-era predecessor. Then as now, the part of FATA known as Waziristan and the home of Pashtun tribesmen offered the fiercest resistance.

The U.S. continues to act similarly. Using [pilotless drones](#) guided with only minimal accuracy from computers at military bases in the Arizona and Nevada deserts among other places, we have killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of unarmed bystanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani and Afghan governments have repeatedly warned that we are alienating precisely the people we claim to be saving for democracy.

When in May 2009, General Stanley McChrystal was appointed as the commander in Afghanistan, he ordered new limits on air attacks, including those carried out by the CIA, except when needed to protect allied troops. Unfortunately, as if to illustrate the incompetence of our chain of command, only two days after this order, on June 23, 2009, the United States carried out a drone attack against a funeral procession that [killed at least 80 people](#), the single deadliest U.S. attack on Pakistani soil so far. There was virtually no reporting of these developments by the mainstream American press or on the network television news.

The Pakistani army and its intelligence arm are staffed, in part, by devout Muslims who fostered the Taliban in

Afghanistan to meet the needs of their own agenda, though not necessarily to advance an Islamic *jihād*. Their purposes have always included: keeping Afghanistan free of Russian or Indian influence, providing a training and recruiting ground for *mujahideen* guerrillas to be used in places like Kashmir (fought over by both Pakistan and India), containing Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan (and so keeping it out of Pakistan), and extorting huge amounts of money from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates, and the United States to pay and train "freedom fighters" throughout the Islamic world. Pakistan's consistent policy has been to support the clandestine policies of the Inter-Services Intelligence and thwart the influence of its major enemy and competitor, India.

Twenty years after the forces of the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan in disgrace, the last Russian general to command them, Gen. Boris Gromov, [issued](#) his own prediction: Disaster, he insisted, will come to the thousands of new forces Obama is sending there, just as it did to the Soviet Union's, which lost some 15,000 soldiers in its own Afghan war. We should recognize that we are wasting time, lives, and resources in an area where we have never understood the political dynamics and continue to make the wrong choices.

3. We Need to End the Secret Shame of Our Empire of Bases

In March, *New York Times* op-ed columnist Bob Herbert [noted](#), "Rape and other forms of sexual assault against women is the great shame of the U.S. armed forces, and there is no evidence that this ghastly problem, kept out of sight as much as possible, is diminishing."

The problem is exacerbated by having our troops garrisoned in overseas bases located cheek-by-jowl next to civilian populations and often preying on them like foreign conquerors. For example, sexual violence against women and girls by American GIs has been out of control in Okinawa, Japan's poorest prefecture, ever since it was permanently occupied by our soldiers, Marines, and airmen some 64 years ago.

That island was the scene of the largest anti-American demonstrations since the end of World War II after the 1995 kidnapping, rape, and attempted murder of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by two Marines and a sailor. The problem of rape has been ubiquitous around all of our bases on every continent and has probably contributed as much to our being loathed abroad as the policies of the Bush administration or our economic exploitation of poverty-stricken countries whose raw materials we covet.

In territories occupied by American military forces, the high command and the State Department make strenuous efforts to enact so-called "Status of Forces Agreements" (SOFAs) that will prevent host governments [from gaining jurisdiction](#) over our troops who commit crimes overseas. The SOFAs also make it easier for our military to spirit culprits out of a country before they can be apprehended by local authorities.

This issue was well illustrated by the case of an Australian teacher, a long-time resident of Japan, who in April 2002 was raped by a sailor from the aircraft carrier USS *Kitty Hawk*, then based at the big naval base at Yokosuka. She identified her assailant and reported him to both Japanese and U.S. authorities. Instead of his being arrested and effectively prosecuted, the victim herself was harassed and humiliated by the local Japanese police. Meanwhile, the U.S. discharged the suspect from the Navy but allowed him to escape Japanese law by returning him to the U.S., where he lives today.

In the course of trying to obtain justice, the Australian teacher discovered that almost fifty years earlier, in October 1953, the Japanese and American governments signed a secret "understanding" as part of their SOFA in which Japan agreed to waive its jurisdiction if the crime was not of "national importance to Japan." The U.S. argued strenuously for this codicil because it feared that otherwise it would face the likelihood of some 350 servicemen per year being sent to Japanese jails for sex crimes.

Since that time the U.S. has negotiated similar wording in SOFAs with Canada, Ireland, Italy, and Denmark. According to the *Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces* (2001), the Japanese practice has become the norm

for SOFAs throughout the world, with predictable results. In Japan, of 3,184 U.S. military personnel who committed crimes between 2001 and 2008, 83% were not prosecuted. In Iraq, we have just signed a SOFA that bears a strong resemblance to the first postwar one we had with Japan: namely, military personnel and military contractors accused of off-duty crimes will remain in U.S. custody while Iraqis investigate. This is, of course, a perfect opportunity to spirit the culprits out of the country before they can be charged.

I believe a better solution would be to radically reduce the size of our standing army, and bring the troops home from countries where they do not understand their environments and have been taught to think of the inhabitants as inferior to themselves.

10 Steps Toward Liquidating the Empire

Dismantling the American empire would, of course, involve many steps. Here are ten key places to begin:

- 1.** We need to put a halt to the serious environmental damage done by our bases planet-wide. We also need to stop writing SOFAs that exempt us from any responsibility for cleaning up after ourselves.
- 2.** Liquidating the empire will end the burden of carrying our empire of bases and so of the "opportunity costs" that go with them -- the things we might otherwise do with our talents and resources but can't or won't.
- 3.** As we already know (but often forget), imperialism breeds the use of torture. In the 1960s and 1970s we helped overthrow the elected governments in Brazil and Chile and underwrote regimes of torture that prefigured our own treatment of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dismantling the empire would potentially mean a real end to the modern American record of using torture abroad.
- 4.** We need to cut the ever-lengthening train of camp followers, dependents, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and hucksters -- along with their expensive medical facilities, housing requirements, swimming pools, clubs, [golf courses](#), and so forth -- that follow our military enclaves around the world.
- 5.** We need to discredit the myth promoted by the military-industrial complex that our military establishment is valuable to us in terms of jobs, scientific research, and defense. These alleged advantages have [long been discredited](#) by serious economic research. Ending empire would make this happen.
- 6.** As a self-respecting democratic nation, we need to stop being the world's largest exporter of arms and munitions and quit educating Third World militaries in the techniques of torture, military coups, and service as proxies for our imperialism. A prime candidate for immediate closure is the so-called School of the Americas, the U.S. Army's infamous military academy at Fort Benning, Georgia, for Latin American military officers. (See Chalmers Johnson, [The Sorrows of Empire](#) [Metropolitan Books, 2004], pp. 136-40.)
- 7.** Given the growing constraints on the federal budget, we should abolish the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and other long-standing programs that [promote militarism](#) in our schools.
- 8.** We need to restore discipline and accountability in our armed forces by radically scaling back our reliance on civilian contractors, private military companies, and agents working for the military outside the chain of command and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Ending empire would make this possible.
- 9.** We need to reduce, not increase, the size of our standing army and deal much more effectively with the wounds our soldiers receive and combat stress they undergo.
- 10.** To repeat the main message of this essay, we must give up our inappropriate reliance on military force as

the chief means of attempting to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Unfortunately, few empires of the past voluntarily gave up their dominions in order to remain independent, self-governing polities. The two most important recent examples are the British and Soviet empires. If we do not learn from their examples, our decline and fall is foreordained.

Chalmers Johnson is the author of [Blowback](#) (2000), [The Sorrows of Empire](#) (2004), and [Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic](#) (2006), and editor of [Okinawa: Cold War Island](#) (1999).

Note on further reading on the matter of sexual violence in and around our overseas bases and rapes in the military: On the response to the 1995 Okinawa rape, see Chalmers Johnson, [Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire](#), chapter 2. On related subjects, see David McNeil, "[Justice for Some. Crime, Victims, and the US-Japan SOFA.](#)" *Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 8-1-09, March 15, 2009; "[Bilateral Secret Agreement Is Preventing U.S. Servicemen Committing Crimes in Japan from Being Prosecuted.](#)" *Japan Press Weekly*, May 23, 2009; Dieter Fleck, ed., [The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces](#), Oxford University Press, 2001; Minoru Matsutani, "[53 Secret Japan-US Deal Waived GI Prosecutions.](#)" *Japan Times*, October 24, 2008; "[Crime Without Punishment in Japan.](#)" *the Economist*, December 10, 2008; "[Japan: Declassified Document Reveals Agreement to Relinquish Jurisdiction Over U.S. Forces.](#)" *Akahata*, October 30, 2008; "Government's Decision First Case in Japan," *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 20, 2008; Dahr Jamail, "[Culture of Unpunished Sexual Assault in Military.](#)" *Antiwar.com*, May 1, 2009; and Helen Benedict, "[The Plight of Women Soldiers.](#)" *the Nation*, May 5, 2009.

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The Empire of Bases in Action: A Recent Example

The Guam International Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

The principal objective of the Guam International Agreement (*GIA*) was to nail down Japan's obligation to transfer \$2.8 billion to the U.S. Treasury as a down payment toward Japan's full share in the cost of construction of new bases in Guam. This was not the first time the U.S. squeezed billions of dollars from Japan. An even larger sum, \$13 billion, was extracted from reluctant Japan at the time of the First Gulf War in 1991. It was not thanked for, however. Instead, it was disparaged as "too little, too late." The U.S. ingenuity to collect Japanese contributions for strategic purposes has almost become a protection racket under the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* (ANPO Treaty) (1960), which places the U.S. in the position of a protector of Japan against external attacks.

The *GIA* was signed in Tokyo on February 18, 2009, approved by the Japanese Diet on May 13, and entered into force on May 19 when the U.S. and Japan exchanged diplomatic notes indicating the respective domestic approvals. The *GIA* recalls and reaffirms major initiatives agreed upon at the May 1, 2006 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). These initiatives are documented in the SCC report: *United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation* (*Roadmap* hereinafter). The *GIA* adds nothing in substance to the *Roadmap*. What is different is that though the *Roadmap* is only a report of a consultative committee, the *GIA* is a bona fide treaty for Japan with the force of law granted treaties by the Constitution of Japan. For the United States, the *GIA* is an executive agreement in need of no "advice and consent" of the Senate or the approval by "two thirds of the Senators present" (*Constitution of the United States of America*, Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2). Although in the U.S. constitutional law executive agreements are equivalent to treaties, the Japanese public appears to feel slighted by the U.S. not exactly following the Constitutional requirements for treaty making as Japan did with respect to the *GIA*.

By Article 98, Paragraph 1, the Constitution of Japan calls itself “supreme law of the nation.” Paragraph 2 commands that [treaties] “shall be faithfully observed.” Based on these stipulations, a generally accepted theory about the standing of treaties in the Japanese legal system has developed: that though treaties may not be as “supreme” as the Constitution, they are superior to domestic laws. In Japan, a treaty must be approved by the Diet (parliament) of Japan: [When the Cabinet makes a treaty] “it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet” (Article 73, Item 3). The Diet is “the highest organ of state power, and ... the sole lawmaking organ of the State” (Article 41). Furthermore, the Emperor lends treaties his incomparable prestige as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people” (Article 1) by promulgating them as one of his mandated “acts in matters of state on behalf of the people” (Article 7, Item 1).

Given the unequal relationship perceived as unfair by the Japanese, it is small wonder that some Japanese try to interpret the *GIA* away to deprive its legal legitimacy in Japan. A fine example of evasive interpretation has surfaced. We first quote a few articles which appear to have agitated the Japanese most.

In Article 1, Paragraph 1, the *GIA* states:

The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) **subject to** paragraph 1 of Article 9 of this Agreement. (Emphasis added.)

The phrase “**subject to**” is frequently used in the *GIA*. Let us see where the “subject to” of Article 1 takes us. Article 9, Paragraph 1, to which Article 1, Paragraph 1 is subject, states:

Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be **subject to** funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. (Emphasis added)

Article 2, to which Article 9, Paragraph 1 is subject, states:

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam **subject to** paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement. (Emphasis added)

Article 9, Paragraph 2, to which Article 2 is subject, states:

United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be **subject to**: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan’s financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap. (Emphasis added)

The chain of “subject to”s is quite extraordinary: Article 1.1 is subject to Article 9.1, which is subject to Article 2, which is subject to Article 9.2, which is subject to (1), (2), and (3), of which (1) was previously found subject to Article 9.2, while (3) was previously found subject to Article 2. Article 2 was also previously found subject to Article 9.2. The quasi-mathematics of the quoted articles of the *GIA* implies some internally determinable system of well chosen variables. There is one variable that is not subject to any other stipulations quoted above. That is Article 9 (3); “tangible progress” made by the Government of Japan (GOJ) toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). This variable is not subject to any other variable in the system of the quoted stipulations. It has moved into the system like a comet from another orbital system. Yet it is the most important factor on which the success or failure of the Relocation depends.

A critical question is under what circumstances the GOJ may fail to make tangible progress in the construction of the FRF at the chosen site for the purpose --- Camp Schwab and the adjacent water areas of Oura Bay and Henoko in Okinawa. Large-scale public works in the Schwab-Oura-Henoko area have been fiercely resisted by Okinawa residents aided by national and international networks of environmentalists and peace activists. The Resistance has kept the earlier FRF plans from implementation for more than a decade. The Okinawa Struggles can be expected to continue against the *Roadmap* and *GIA*.

Comments

Many Japanese commentators, politicians, and scholars promptly denounced the *GIA* as an unfair deal that demeaned Japan's international standing and imposed a disproportionate share of burden on Japan for the Relocation. The idea of Japan having to finance and undertake the construction of new U.S. military bases in Guam, a U.S. territory, was perceived as a peculiar peacetime happening in normal relations between two independent sovereign states. For decades the Japanese have been resigned to the oppression of the ANPO Treaty obligations to provide the U.S. forces with the areas and facilities of bases in Japan. But where is the legal basis for Japan building bases for the U.S. military on the U.S. soil? The Japanese government gives no convincing answers to this question. The feeling that the construction of bases in a U.S. territory for the U.S. military is an unfair burden forced on Japan seems widespread. Even the GOJ officials argued in the course of Diet deliberation that the *GIA* lacked legally binding force (*hōteki kōsokuryoku*) (*Ryukyu Shinpo*, April 10, 2009). The *Ryukyu Shinpo* quotes: "The Agreement reiterates the *political will* expressed in the *Roadmap*; it does not impose *legal obligations*." (Emphasis added.) Deflating the legitimacy of the Agreement as an international treaty may have offered them some soothing moments.

After reportedly checking with the U.S. Government (USG), other GOJ officials pointed to the possibility that the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam was not a sure thing under the terms of *GIA* Article 9. For example, if the USG did not make available the U.S. share of funds for the Guam projects, the Japanese side could also suspend its financial contributions. (*Ryukyu Shinpo*, April 10, 2009.) The process of Relocation would then grind to a halt and the Marines would remain in Okinawa. Likewise, if the GOJ failed to implement the FRF project, which in fact had been stalled more than a decade since the idea was agreed upon between Japan and the U.S., the USG could suspend its share of base construction in Guam. Nothing would then change in the status quo of the bases in Okinawa. However, this result would be perfectly acceptable to the USG, because keeping all of what they have gained has always been the strategy of the USG. The proposal to move the Marines from Okinawa to Guam might have been only a clever tactic of obfuscation until events would prove that the simultaneous fulfillment of those three conditions in Article 9 of the *GIA* was impossible anyway. The U.S. forces would be happy to keep staying in their most preferred location --- Okinawa --- regardless of the wishes of the GOJ or Okinawa.

Most intriguingly, it appears that the *GIA* articles quoted above might actually make the scuttling of the Guam plans easy without rancor. The text seems to permit either Japan or the U.S. to fail at their promises gracefully. If the U.S. fails, that allows Japan to retract the \$2.8 billion cash contributions as implied in Article 9(1). If Japan fails at the FRF plans, that allows the U.S. to cancel the Guam plans by Article 9(2). The collapse of the Guam plans may well be a secret wish on both sides. Why? Japan saves money. The U.S. returns to its preferred position -- the status quo forever. In the end, then, the *GIA* is a remarkable Kabuki play. The history of U.S.-Japan relations is full of similar theatricals. In a few more years (the deadline for the completion of all construction work is 2014), the nice little package of the *GIA* might implode due to its own built-in contradictions. What will be the next show? (kt)

For background information (www.uchinanchu.org/uchinanchu/ryukyuanist.htm):

"Futenma replacement: Okinawa's long winter, SCC (October 29, 2005) to SCC (May 1, 2006), *The Ryukyuanist*, No. 70

“MCAS Futenma Relocation Plans: From SACO (1996) to SCC (2005), *ibid.*, No. 69

“SOFA: A symbol of sovereign failure of Japan?” *ibid.*, No. 64

For further reading (<http://japanfocus.org>): *Japan Focus* articles on the Guam International Agreement and related topics, February to September 2009

Sakurai, Kunitoshi “The Guam Treaty as a Modern ‘Disposal’ of the Ryukyus,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Vol. 38-1-09, September 21, 2009. “Introduction” by Gavan McCormack. Translated by Takeda Kyouusuke and Takeda Yuusuke

Maeda, Tetsuo “Escape from Dependency: An Agenda for Transforming the Structure of Japanese Security and the U.S.-Japan Relationship,” *ibid.*, Vol. 36-1-09, September 7, 2009. Translated by Vic Korschman

Hayashi, Kiminori; Oshima, Ken’ichi; Yokemoto, Masafumi “Overcoming American Military Base Pollution in Asia: Japan, Okinawa, Philippines,” *ibid.*, Vol. 28-2-09, July 13, 2009. Translated by Christopher Nelson.

Orihara, Toshio “Peace Education in Japan’s Schools: A View from the Front Lines,” *ibid.*, Vol. 16-2-09, April 19, 2009

Catherine Lutz “U.S. Bases and Empire: Global Perspectives on the Asia-Pacific” (revised and condensed introduction to Catherine Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*, London: Pluto Press; New York: New York University Press, 2009), *ibid.*, Vol. 12-3-09, March 16, 2009. This book is extensively reviewed in “Chalmers Johnson on the Cost of Empire” posted at *Truthdig*, a Web magazine devoted to “digging beneath the headlines,” on May 15, 2009. (http://www.truthdig.com/arts_culture/item/20090514_Chalmers_Johnson_on_the_cost_of_empire) From among all the excellent chapters of the Lutz volume, Johnson’s “choice of the best article” is Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, “Okinawa Women’s Struggle for Demilitarization.”

Miyume TANJI “Community, Resistance, and Sustainability in an Okinawan Village: Yomitan,” *ibid.*, 9-1-09, February 25, 2009

Gavan McCormack “Hillary in Japan – The Enforcer,” *ibid.*, Vol. 8-7-09, February 22, 2009

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