

The Ryukyuanist

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This issue is focused on what is called, in Japan, an “interim report” of the Security Consultative Committee, especially on its recommendations for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa. Alphabet soup is served along the way. *Bon appétit!*

Mr. Milton Takei offers profound thoughts on how to play music (p.5)

In memoriam: ASHIMINE Eiichi (p.6)

Publications (L)(p.7)

MCAS Futenma Relocation Plans: From SACO (1996) to SCC (2005)

The Ryukyu Islands were occupied and governed by the U.S. military until 1972. Although these islands were returned to Japan and re-constituted as Okinawa Prefecture, history casts a powerful spell over the thoughts and actions of the U.S. government (USG) and the government of Japan (GOJ) with respect to the geopolitical status of Okinawa. In the minds of the U.S. and Japanese leaders, Okinawa is still under U.S. military occupation. They are therefore in agreement: whatever the formal status of Okinawa may be, priority of land use policy in Okinawa should go to U.S. military needs, overriding people’s needs.

Nearly 20% of Okinawa Island, where more than 90% of Okinawa Prefecture’s people live, and vast air and water spaces around it are occupied, controlled and managed by the U.S. military. For the entire Okinawa Prefecture, the proportion of the U.S.-occupied land is nearly 11%. No other prefecture of Japan shares its living space and resources so generously with the U.S. military as Okinawa does. The next highest percentage of the U.S.-occupied land among all 25 prefectures hosting U.S. bases is Shizuoka’s 1.2%. The high density of the U.S. military presence breeds a high level of popular resentment against it. Public opinion of Okinawa demands the removal of the bases.

However, Japan’s national government that should be responsible for the protection of nationals against adverse impacts of international geopolitics is insensitive to Okinawa’s grievances. Okinawa is often forced to resort to mass demonstrations of outrage to shame the national government into taking notice. However, considerations that Okinawa receives as a result are usually an absolute minimum with strings attached. These strings add new problems to the old problems that continue to remain neglected. Thus the “Okinawa problems” multiply as Okinawa seeks and struggles for national solutions. Okinawa, though governed by a country that prides on its democracy, suffers from an increasing political alienation and immiseration that threaten to tear apart Okinawa’s own political and social fabric.

MCAS Futenma, SACO, and SBF

A case in point is the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), billed as a show-case item in U.S.-Japan responses to Okinawa’s anger at the excessive U.S. military presence that erupted in the wake of a heinous crime of U.S. servicemen (gang rape of a twelve-year old school girl in September 1995). In 1996, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) came up with its final report on the reduction and consolidation of the U. S. bases in Okinawa. Among many recommendations the report made, the most significant was the re-location of MCAS Futenma from Ginowan City to a “sea-based facility” (SBF) to be built somewhere off the east coast of Okinawa in five to seven years. It is nine years since the SACO report, but Futenma has not moved. In August 2004, a helicopter (CH53D) on a training flight from Futenma crashed onto the nearby campus of the Okinawa International University, an accident the university would have been spared, had Futenma moved elsewhere in “5 to 7 years.”

SACO had examined three alternative facilities and picked SBF. In defending the choice of SBF, the final SACO report (released on December 2, 1996) said:

Compared to the other two options [the incorporation of the heliport into Kadena Air Base and construction of a heliport at Camp Schwab], the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary. (Introduction b.)

Okinawan people did not consider SBF in Okinawa the best option for their safety and quality of life. For them, the option deserving the “best” rating was the removal of MCAS Futenma from Okinawa with no strings attached. SACO’s SBF as a Futenma replacement would only reproduce and impose the same base-hosting burdens on another community.

Attempts to implement the SACO recommendations have drifted aimlessly. The idea of a Futenma replacement itself has gone through many twists and turns, becoming increasingly irrelevant. Nine years after the SACO final report, GOJ and USG announced a new plan about the Futenma replacement facility (FRF) on October 29, 2005. The proposal of FRF apparently cancels SACO’s SBF and proposes the construction of the FRF in the “shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay.” From Okinawa’s standpoint, SACO’s SBF was bad enough. The latest plan is no improvement. Worse, it clearly implies that the suggested FRF is going to be a new permanently fixed base, while it is possible that SBF was a temporary stopgap.

The more GOJ and USG tinker with the issues of U.S. bases in Okinawa, the worse the solutions that emerge tend to be. The reason is not hard to find. Basically, GOJ and USG are satisfied with the status quo of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Professor Chalmers Johnson offers what almost sounds like a cardinal law of U.S. base entrenchment as follows:

Once the military has acquired a base, it is extremely reluctant to give it up. Instead, new uses are found for it. The American presence on Okinawa, for example, was first justified by the need to mount an invasion of the main Japanese islands... then as a secure enclave for fighting the war in Korea, next as a forward base for deploying force against China, then as a B-52 bomber base and staging area for the Vietnam War, a training area for jungle warfare, and most recently a home base for troops and aircraft that might be used elsewhere in Asia or the Middle East. (*The Sorrows of Empire* [New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2004], pp. 34-35).

GOJ’s complacency with the state of U.S. bases in Okinawa derives from GOJ’s willing dependence on U.S. protection by virtue of the U.S.-Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security. This treaty obligates the U.S. to defend Japan against external armed attacks. For this purpose Japan provides “areas and facilities” for use by the U.S. forces. GOJ provides a preponderance of such “areas and facilities” in Okinawa so that the rest of Japan may get a free ride for security on the back of Okinawa.

If GOJ and USG find satisfaction in the concentration of bases in Okinawa, Okinawan people and the Okinawa Prefectural government (OPG) are unhappy to bear the burdens of bases. But OPG finds its hands tied. On the one hand it depends on GOJ for resources with which to respond to problems caused by the U.S. military presence as well as by the misguided policy measures GOJ keeps forcing on Okinawa. OPG-GOJ relations offer a good opportunity for studying how a powerful, rich, and overbearing national government overrides and overwhelms a poor, weak, timid local government.

GOJ allows a severely limited range of choices for Okinawa. Governor Inamine Keiichi’s Futenma replacement plan helped him win two terms. But his insistence on it may weaken the prospect for his third term. His predecessor, Governor Ota Masahide, wanted the Futenma base taken away from Okinawa. This was not within the range of choices GOJ tolerated. GOJ determined that Governor Ota had to go. Candidate Inamine went along with the idea of replacement within Okinawa. GOJ helped him defeat Ota.

During the campaign in 1998, Candidate Inamine insisted that he was “realistic” enough not to seek a “best but undoable” policy and that he would settle for a “better and doable policy.” He projected himself as a man of action, not of talk. Having passed the first test of acceptability to GOJ, Inamine bravely added some frills to the shape of the new base to replace Futenma. It was to be a large military/civilian joint-use airport

to be made exclusively civilian after 15 years of joint use. He appeared to be saying that a delay of 15 years was a fair price to pay for the acquisition of a full-fledged civilian airport. With the new governor in office, OPG examined many possible alternative sites for a Futenma replacement and settled on a location off the coast of Henoko, a district of Nago City. Governor Inamine rejected SACO's SBF in favor of an offshore manmade island built in part on the barrier reefs hugging the east coast of Nago City. The airport island was to be large enough to support a runway 2500m long and 735m wide, some 2km offshore from the residential area of Henoko.

USG welcomed Inamine's willingness to build a Futenma replacement in Okinawa, but rejected the idea of term limits on the military use of the facility. GOJ adopted Inamine's proposal as a national project, though in highly general language. The location of FRF was called "Henoko coast part of Camp Schwab's sea area," an expression that GOJ later interpreted flexibly. From the beginning, everybody knew how environmentally reckless the project was. Its implementation was overwhelmed by fierce protests of the residents of the impacted areas and antiwar, pro-environment activists from Okinawa, Japan and overseas. Having seen the effectiveness of the civil protests, GOJ quietly shelved the Inamine proposal and looked for alternatives. USG did the same. Early in 2005, GOJ and USG adopted common defense objectives for East Asia and began serious consultation on the MCAS Futenma issue within the new U.S. realignment designs for overseas bases.

Watching the progress in the realignment of U.S. overseas bases, Governor Inamine too sensed that he had to adapt his priorities to the new realities. He said that in the context of realities of a few years ago, he was compelled to adopt a second best rather than "the best" option for Futenma replacement. Now he saw the possibilities for the best option – total removal of MCAS Futenma from Okinawa as Okinawa's public had always wanted. Good news came from Tokyo at the right time: i.e., in November 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi himself reportedly talked about the possibility of moving the U.S. Marines out of Okinawa. (It became clear later that he really did not mean it.) When Governor Inamine visited Washington in March 2005, he pleaded with U.S. officials for relocating the Marines outside of Okinawa, apparently so fervently that U.S. journalists were said to complain that this "conservative" governor who professed support for the U.S.-Japan alliance was not doing anything good for the U.S. They cold-shouldered him and did not consider his visit worth reporting on.

By June 2005, the tide had turned again: it was discovered that for some time, GOJ and USG at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), a.k.a. "2 plus 2," had been quarrelling over where exactly in the Henoko area the Futenma replacement facility (FRF) should be placed. Moving Futenma out of Okinawa was never on the agenda of "2 plus 2." Nor was the idea of joint military-civilian use of FRF. By September, the "2 plus 2" negotiation had clearly reached an impasse. Quite remarkably, despite intensive SCC activities for months, information on what was going on there was not made public in any systematic manner.

Reportedly Japan insisted on a "hillside plan" (*Nairiku An*), while the U.S. countered with a "shoals plan" (*Asase An*), a modified SBF plan. There is a range of hills with peaks rising to more than 300 m above the sea level, about 4 km northwest of Henoko and within the area occupied by Camp Schwab. Japan's Defense Agency director general proposed that a new MCAS be built on the slopes of these hills at an elevation overlooking Henoko and other communities. The U.S. wanted the MCAS to be put on an offshore island to be built on shoals between Henoko's shoreline and barrier reefs. The new offshore island was to be much smaller than Governor Inamine's and for military use only. Both Japan and the U.S. stubbornly defended their respective plans. The exasperated Defense Agency director general is said to have remarked: "though not as wide as the Pacific Ocean, the U.S.-Japan gap is still pretty wide." (He was exaggerating: the "gap" measured on the map is no more than 5 km!)

As the deadline closed in, the Japanese side produced a compromise plan ("Shoreline Plan" – *Engan An*), and the U.S. side after some fidgeting agreed. What GOJ offered was a conventional "split the difference" type of compromise. The FRF in this plan was both land-based (Japanese idea) and sea-based (U.S. idea). The result was apparently a "win-win" for both GOJ and USG. But there was a loser --- Okinawa. On October 29, 2005, SCC released a document titled "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment

for the Future” over the signatures of “2 plus 2” (Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense of the United States, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director General of the Defense Agency of Japan.

The “Shoreline Plan” for FRF

The “2 plus 2” document rejects Okinawa’s top preference – moving MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa – on grounds that “rapid crisis response capabilities “ (a dominant principle that trumps all other considerations) “consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements” and that “sustaining those capabilities remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training , exercises and operations.” ”For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.” (This excuse for keeping the Marines in Okinawa is already accounted for by Chalmers Johnson in a passage quoted earlier from his *The Sorrows of Empire*.)

The new location and the shape of the new FRF are described in the SCC document as follows:

... both sides will locate the FRF in an “L”-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline area of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The Runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki [Cape Henoko], extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with total length of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangers, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay.

From the newspaper illustrations of the “Shoreline Plan,” we estimate that its total area may be less than 120 ha, which would be less than ¼ of the area of MCAS Futenma (= 481 ha). Clearly, it would be difficult to transfer all of personnel, infrastructure, equipment, and functions of Futenma to FRF at Henoko. About 3,000 Marines are stationed at Futenma today. What proportion of this number will be accommodated at FRF Henoko? The SCC document does not answer this question, but recommends “the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa.” This force reduction will be realized by “the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region,” which includes the relocation to Guam of “the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF).” At present there are about 17,000 Marines in Okinawa, of which 7,000 is no mean figure. This induces a question: Why not include all of the 3,000 Futenma Marines in the 7,000 moving to Guam? If this can be done, there is no need for FRF at Henoko!

SCC’s strategic principle for keeping the Marines in Okinawa was already stated earlier: i.e., “rapid crisis response capabilities,” which consist of “air, ground, logistics and command elements” in “a coherent package” (a concept much prized by SCC). This implies, one surmises, that some of the helicopter units stationed at Futenma must remain in Okinawa as part of the necessary “elements” of the “rapid response capabilities.” Even so, the whole package after realignment will include fewer Marines than their present level in Okinawa. The document says: [after the reduction of 7,000 Marines] “the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).

Will Okinawa ever “ratify” the “2 plus 2” agreement? In the next issue, we will consider Okinawa’s protests against it that have already begun and the efforts of GOJ and USG to help or force Okinawa to understand and accept the agreement’s recommendations. A follow-up SCC report is due in March 2006.
(kt)

Background information:

“A comedy or a tragedy? The politics of term limits on a new U.S. military base,” *The Ryukyuanist* No. 61.

“SOFA: A symbol of sovereign failure of Japan?” *The Ryukyuanist* No. 64.

Communication

Jam Sessions, the folk process in action

In Professor Garfias' article, "A Personal Message to the Musicians of Okinawa Prefecture" (*The Ryukyuanist*, No. 68), I notice that he makes the same point I make in my letter (in the same issue of *The Ryukyuanist*) regarding the need for musicians to interpret the sheet music. I have suspected that Irish music has, over the years, been conforming to Western European classical music, while still remaining authentic. I define "authenticity" as what people do for themselves without commercial pressure.

Many musicians would disagree with me, but I maintain that the most common "A"-note in Irish music is lower than the "concert-A" of classical orchestras. I believe that the two concertinas people play in the Eugene jam session are both "a little flat" (only a technician can tune these instruments). One musician told me that his electronic tuner was causing him to tune his instrument sharp.

I was puzzled by how Okinawan music could be both widespread and in danger of standardization. I would think that the more musicians that are involved, the greater difficulty anyone would have in controlling them. Where do the music police get such power?

To use the examples of the Japanese and English languages, governments make great efforts at standardization, yet people persist in speaking regional variants. On the "Car Talk" program on National Public Radio, the two radio personalities are brothers and business partners, yet one apparently went to college and assimilated into Hollywood English, while the other retains a New England accent.

Jam sessions expose musicians to different styles of music. In the Eugene Irish jam sessions, we had Allison Solberg, who is a Scottish fiddle player, and actually spent a year in Scotland while in college. Tony Wright was originally an old time fiddle player. I, myself, am a New England-style fiddle player. The three of us would bring different influences to the jam sessions. In what Sandy Bradley would call the folk process in action, musicians can copy what they hear other people playing. The bricoleurs among the musicians can create their own style from what is readily available, without having a final end product in mind.

People can visit Ireland, where the musicians in different parts of the country play slightly different styles. The tourists can tape record what they hear in the jam sessions. New people can join the Eugene jam sessions. Beginners get better, becoming the equivalents of black belts. After reading Professor Garfias' article, I went to the old time jam session, and noticed that Andrea Wyckoff and Jim Caudle play slightly different styles (both are fiddle teachers, though Andrea told me that she currently has no students). Given the conditions, how could anyone standardize the music?

Many musicians do not have teachers; rather, they have role models. At the old time jam session, someone told me that she had been playing the banjo for only a week. I told her that if she wanted to learn to play old time music, she had come to the right place. She sat in the circle, trying to copy the other two banjo players, and they gave her some pointers.

After some thought, I came to the conclusion that some people who play Okinawan music are attempting to deny recognition to other musicians. By denigrating other musicians, they can hope to earn more money playing music, or teaching.

Milton Takei
Oregon

In memoriam: ASHIMINE Eiichi (1924-2005)

ASHIMINE Eiichi, Okinawa's doyen of modern poetry and a member of the Nominating Committee for the prestigious YAMANOKUCHI Baku Prize, died of pneumonia in Tokyo on October 4, 2005. His leadership in the community of poets in Okinawa began with the organization of a poetry society called *Sangoshô* (Coral Reef) in 1952. His publications include a 1984 collection of his poems, *Hikari no ikada* (A Raft of Light) followed by *ASHIMINE Eiichi shishû* (Collection of ASHIMINE Eiichi Poems) (1985) and another collection (1990). For many years, he diligently served as an editor/referee for the *Ryukyu Shinpô*'s poetry page, which is widely known as a portal for poets' fame in Okinawa. In his non-artistic phase of life, Mr. Ashimine was a bank employee, rising to the position of comptroller at the Bank of Okinawa.

Mr. Ashimine's dedication to the training and promotion of younger poets of Okinawa is legendary. Mr. TAKARA Ben, a prominent product of the "Ashimine School," recalls his mentor's philosophy of poetry in these words: "Poetry is a sea anemone for aesthetic consciousness" (*be-ishiki no isoginchaku*). The uninitiated might need time to fathom and appreciate the metaphor.

In 1950-51, Mr. Ashimine studied in the United States as an exchange student, based mainly at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. There were many students from Okinawa there in the same year and Mr. Ashimine was a natural leader for them. When they left at a year's end, they left behind a booklet born of their months of painful struggles with English composition: *Through Okinawan Eyes*, edited by Jane Kluckhohn and Edward G. Lueders (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1951).

Mr. Ashimine contributed two short essays to this booklet: the preface for the volume and a chapter in Part III. These essays may be the only known mementos of this poet's experiment with English as a medium of expression. Though presented in prose form, they read like poetry. Below we reproduce the preface.

Timorous Whispers (preface to *Through Okinawan Eyes*, 1951)

Timorous whispers are what the young travelers leave behind in the purple evenings on the land of yucca, cactus, and for them, of the new horizon.

From a group of tiny Pacific islands, abundant in the pearls of modesty, obedience, and tranquility, they came to see with their own eyes the mecca of the twentieth century. They wanted to know what America looks like and how its people live, think, and act; and they wished to seek for the blue bird of the four freedoms and for the absolute democratia which their forefathers had never dreamed of.

Yes, they came, and they saw the blue bird. At least they thought they saw it; some in the friendly smiles of their English instructors; others, in the tranquil eyes of their adviser on the campus; still others in the tremendous feast of critical reasoning in their classrooms and their campus discussions. And also, on the neat, wooden floor of the Ernie Pyle Memorial Library, on the shoulders of a Negro pastor at a Pueblo Indian Methodist Church, on the window sill of an old engineer's parlor, could they not recognize its silver track?

In such physical or metaphysical environment as above, somehow, the humble desire for self-expression began gradually to stir their fragile leaves of sensibility. They wanted to say something profound and impressive. They wanted to release what they had in their hearts. They made their lips point to voice their inner convictions.

But alas! The voice did not come out as they had expected. They uttered timorous whispers to the Sandia Mountains or to Mount Taylor, of their hometown, of Memories, of Adversity, and of findings in American life.

These whispers, however, go up and still up in the bottomless heaven as long as the yellow smoke of their memories in the land of enchantment keeps rising from this campfire built by them, all the Ryukyuan Students at the University of New Mexico.

Eiichi Ashimine

Publications (L)

We appreciate the gifts of, and free access to, the following publications:

(1) Print media (books, journals, etc., printed on paper)

Hosei University Institute for Okinawan Studies. 2005. *Okibunken Shohô* (IOS Report), No. 57. Tokyo. 80 pp. This special issue on Yaeyama contains a number of reports, notes and discussions on highly specialized topics related to Yaeyama such as Yaeyama gentry's involvement in the Ryukyu Kingdom's "peace diplomacy" in early 1800's, problems of historical townscapes in Taketomi today, analysis of "Panariyaki" (Panari pottery of Aragusuku Island) and others. Each paper delves deeply into a tightly focused subject. What is in need is an overview article to put these disparate contributions in perspective in relation to "Okinawan studies" as a field. Three well-written book reviews seem to be conscious of this need. In the remainder of the issue, the report provides useful information on publications received, study meetings and other events, and names of staff members and researchers associated with the Institute.

Okinawa International University Institute of Ryukyuan Culture. 2005. *NANTO BUNKA/ Bulletin of the Institute of Ryukyuan Culture*, No. 27. 160 pp. The contents demonstrate a trend in the study of Ryukyuan culture: expansion of the scope and methods of this field. Three articles are on "non-conventional" topics: "Physical and Chemical Properties of the Soil of the Jeju-do, Korea"; "The Current State of Today's Youth --- As Viewed by Those Working with Yanbaru Yourth" (a psycho-cultural analysis of adolescent delinquency); and "An Evaluation of the Home Pages of All 52 Municipalities in Okinawa with the Aim of Promoting Tourism." "Conventional" topics are "Characteristics of Roof Tiles in the History of Ceramics in Yaeyama Islands" (archeological work); review of Eiji YAMAMOTO, *Kokka wo shôsha suru 'chiiki' / Okiinawa and Japan: Exposing the National State* [in light of the history, culture, and legacy of Ryukyu Kingdom]; "Archiving of the Ryukyu Industrial System Records and Research on Ryukyuan Vocabulary: Part IV" (last in the series).

Research Institute for Culture and Cultural History, Notre Dame Seishin University. 2005. *Annual Report*, vol. 18. Professor YOKOYAMA Manabu's study of Frank Hawley continues. The contribution to this issue is "Frank Hawley and His Research of Japan's Early Lexicon: A Historical Narrative of the published papers of 'Wamyô-Ruijû-shû' (1883) found in the Diary of Tatsuyuki Mori" (pp. 71-113).

SASAKI Kômei. 2003. *Minami karano Nihon Bunka (jo)* (Japanese culture from the South, vol. I). Tokyo: NHK Press. 282 pp. ¥1,120 + tax. This book, though clearly a contribution to Japanese anthropology, represents a scholarly integration of Ryukyuan studies and Japanese studies. Paying homage to Yanagita's *Kaijô no michi*, the author offers his theory as "Shin kaijô no michi." He consolidates extant studies, including his own, on the origins and development of Japanese agriculture centering on rice cultivation and discovers Austronesian influences that must have come to Japan via the "southern route," i.e. Ryukyu Islands. This provokes questions about the identity of the people who came with Austronesian rice culture to the Ryukyus and Japan.

(2) Non-print media (e-journals, blogs, discs, tapes, etc.)

Ginowan City, Okinawa. 2005. *The Wishes of 89,000 people*. DVD, 25 minutes, in two parts. The first part presents Okinawa's reactions to the gang rape of a 12-year-old local schoolgirl by U.S. military servicemen in September 1995. A major event around which the narrative and images are organized is the massive rally of 89,000 people on October 28, 1995 to protest against the excessive U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The second part takes up the crash in August 2003 of a Marine Corps helicopter onto the campus of Okinawa International University and its aftermath. Available from the Japan Policy research Institute (www.jpri.org), while supply lasts.

KINJO Tetsuo (scenarist, director, producer). 1962. *Yoshiya Chiruu Monogatari* (The Story of Yoshiya Chiruu). VHS, 105 minutes. Naha: Tomoyose Audio-Visual Teaching Aids Co. Black and white motion picture. The original film is a rare convergence of Okinawa's history, literature, poetry, and performing arts. Yoshiya Chirû (1650-1668), of humble origin, was a "geisha" of many talents, especially excelling in Ryukyuan poetry. A relationship of mutual encouragement in the art of poetry between Chirû and a Shuri

aristocrat develops into a romantic one, which was unsustainable in a hierarchical society. Hurt, helpless, and depressed, she takes her own life at age 19. Her legendary stature was assured by a work of Heshikiya Chobin (1700-1734), a Ryukyu court noble learned in Japanese classical literature. Chobin was implicated, probably unjustly, in a political scandal and executed for treason by order of the fabled, immortalized prime minister of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Sai On (1682-1761). Kinjo Tetsuo (1939-76), the scenario writer for the Ultra Man movies of Japan, made the *Yoshiya Chirû Monogatari* early in his career before moving to Japan. At the peak of his Japanese fame, he returned to Okinawa and devoted himself to Okinawa's traditional performing arts. He was unhappy and unfulfilled, however. He died young from an accident. Many of the Ultra Man generation are just beginning to discover Kinjo's Okinawan roots. Kiyomura Etsuko, acclaimed as Okinawa's Hara Setsuko, plays Chirû.

Ogimi-son Janagusuku no Mukashi-uta wo Kiroku suru Kai (Association for Recording the Bygone Days' Songs of Janagusuku, Ogimi-son). 2004. *Ogimi-son Janagusuku no Mukashi-uta/ Songs of Janagusuku, Ogimi, Okinawa*. CD by MUSICALE AOI, Okinawa. ¥2000, including tax. A 38-page pamphlet enclosed with the CD contains extensive introduction by Hig Etsuko (president of the Association, ethnomusicologist), transcriptions of songs, and interpretive essays by Sugimoto Nobuo (professor of music). Ms Higa explains how the association for recording traditional songs of this community has come into being (fear of extinction of traditional songs under pressure of cultural change). The CD arranges the songs under four headings: ritual/religious, children's, folk, and *shichiguachidii* (songs for the females-only Obon dance).

Okinawa-ken Ginowan-shi Kyôiku Iinkai (Board of Education, Ginowan, Okinawa). 2004. *Ginowan no Tsunahiki: Otoni Kiku, Eizou ni Miru* (Tug of War in Ginowan: Hear the Sound, See the Images). A set of CD (music and songs), DVD (images) and a 24-page pamphlet that contains HIGA Etsuko's comments and the texts of the *tsunahiki* songs. In former times, Tsunahiki was a major event in the village festival at the completion of rice harvest in July (by the lunar calendar). Although rice cultivation is no longer important, *tsunahiki* continues to be an almost mandatory major event of lunar July in many Okinawan communities.

Uzagaku Fukugen Ensô Kenkyûkai (Research Association for the Restoration and Performance of Ceremonial Music [of the Ryukyu royal court]). 2003. *Uzagaku* (Ceremonial music). CD recording of performances at the RBC hall on April 6, 2003. 30 minutes. The Ryukyu Kingdom's court culture dissipated following the transformation of Ryukyu into Okinawa Prefecture. The rediscovery and restoration of cultural details of life during the kingdom era have made considerable progress in recent years. Material aspects of culture such as castles, palaces, gardens, etc. have been extensively researched and restored. Progress has been slower in non-material aspects. The restoration of performing arts has been particularly difficult. The program recorded in this CD owes its success to a small group of dedicated researchers such as HIGA Etsuko, ethnomusicologist. It opens with the most solemn *Heshengzhao* – celebration of the sacred rule of the Emperor, followed by seven more pieces of *Uzagaku*, and concludes with a Ryukyuan hymn *Kajâdifû bushi*. Instruments are all Chinese and the songs, except for the last hymn, are also in Chinese.

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