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If the United States had been true to what it had always protested --- no territorial ambition in dealing with defeated Japan, Okinawa would have continued to be part of Japan as Okinawa Prefecture irrespective of the Battle of Okinawa which temporarily produced an anomalous condition as a conquered area under military government. Imagine what amount of time and resources would have been saved and put to better uses by an initial decision not to disrupt the administrative continuity of Okinawa.

Fifty-five years since 1945, it is clear that "no territorial ambition" was either a lie or an instance of diplomatic Newspeak meaning the opposite of ordinary speech. At the beginning of the new millennium, the United States still occupies 20% of Okinawa Island and vast areas of sea and sky around it. "How many more years as a U.S. military colony!?" Okinawans wonder.

A peace treaty should have been an opportunity to normalize Okinawa's administrative status. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, however, included the infamous Article 3 stipulating that pending the U.S. proposal to place the Ryukyu Islands under U.N. trusteeship, the United States will have "the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters."

It was a bogus idea to place the Ryukyus under U.N. trusteeship. The U.S. had no intention to propose it even when the article was being drafted. Moreover, the U.S. took "all and any powers" literally and unabashedly concentrated all governing powers in the U.S. hands with zero powers left to the Ryukyans. The stateless Ryukyans' rights of "life, liberty, and property" were presumed nonexistent and subject to any and all kinds of infringement by the U.S. government and its military outpost in Okinawa.

The outcome was a disaster to the Ryukyans and a disgrace to the United States. Freed even from a minimum democratic constraint that the government derives its legitimate powers from the consent of the governed, the United States unilaterally installed a form of government which vested all powers in an active-duty lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, who simultaneously commanded the U.S. armed forces in the Ryukyus and governed the Ryukyans as High Commissioner of the Ryukyus.

The ethos, style, and outcome of the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus varied to some extent according to the ruling commissioner's character, taste, and world view. One commissioner practiced tyranny, another appeasement. It appeared to Ryukyans that Washington was manipulating them by alternately sending down contrasting types of commissioners like one prone to tyranny succeeded by one leaning toward appeasement, then back to a tyrant, later replaced by an appeaser, and so on.

It is a supreme irony that the United States, leader of the world's

democracies, governed the Ryukyus by a military dictatorship for 27 years, giving credence to the cliché that absolute power corrupts absolutely.

In this issue of *The Ryukyuanist*, Professor Etsujiro Miyagi, a foremost authority on the history of the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyus, contributes an illuminating essay on how High Commissioner Lt. General F. T. Unger governed the Ryukyus. General Unger died in January 1999. An essay in memoriam appeared in *The Ryukyuanist* No. 44.

Communications

In the wake of the Unger obituary, Mr. Edward Freimuth has written to the desk: "It should be noted that it was fortunate that Unger was HICOM [High Commissioner] at the time Yara was elected rather than some character such as Caraway, an earlier HICOM. Who knows what would have happened then? Probably constant conflict, since Caraway never could accept someone (like Yara) with power from the voters who might challenge his dominant HICOM role."

Shannon McCune's "Some Western Accounts of the Ryukyu Islands" (*The Ryukyuanist*, No. 45) has attracted considerable reader attention. Dr. Charles Myers, a collector of Ryukyu-related books, probes the meaning of the editor's comments on the sources surveyed by McCune as "relatively accessible."

"In reference to this," writes Myers, "I must suppose that the term alludes to the availability of materials from interlibrary loan programs and not available from general purchase at the local book store. Please note that few if any of the items are readily available from the publisher; however, many are available through used and antiquarian book vendors."

Myers provides a list of 41 items to supplement the McCune survey. He also sends along a 4-page, 2-column, single-space, closely typed list of books in his private library. We will be glad to supply copies of these lists to interested readers on demand.

Mr. Bill Steele, an entrepreneur, was in Okinawa as a writer for the *Life on Okinawa* magazine and got to know Shannon McCune, Civil Administrator under HICOM Caraway, very well. The October 1962 issue includes Steele's report on his interview with McCune: "A Chat with Mr. McCune" (pp. 24-26). This is a valuable document. So far no other written material on McCune in Okinawa has come to our attention.

In a letter to the desk, Steele tells a new story that was not told in the article mentioned above. "During the interview he asked me to look out the window of his office and tell him what I saw I replied, 'I see two school-kids going home after school.'"

That was not what McCune wanted for an answer. After a few more exchanges of questions and answers, Steele hit upon the right answer: "I see two children wearing uniforms that were no doubt made in Japan and could just as easily be made here in the Ryukyu Islands." Steele then observes: "Shannon's example of the school children's uniforms ... resulted in the employment of hundreds of Ryukyans and the birth of an all-Ryukyuan textile industry - a real additive to the economy."

Though not an economist, the late Professor McCune obviously understood the principle of industrialization via import substitution.

**High Commissioner Ferdinand Unger
and
U.S. Policy Toward Okinawa**

by
Etsujiro Miyagi*

The tenure of Lt. Gen. Ferdinand T. Unger as the fifth High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands (November 1966 - January 1969) marked a turning point in American policy toward Okinawa. He took office just when the U.S. Government started to delve with all seriousness into the question of returning to Japan the administrative rights over the Ryukyus which the U.S. military establishment had always adamantly refused to give up.

He was the first high commissioner who publicly declared to Ryukyuan leaders that the administrative control over the Ryukyus could be separated from the maintenance of an effective military base.

"Upon analysis, your objective of ultimate reunification with Japan is *not incompatible* [italics added] with my objective of maintaining an effective base," he said in his annual message to the Ryukyuan Legislature on February 3, 1967.

He also said elsewhere in that speech: "I have promised that I will delegate to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) an increasing amount of authority as fast as you create the necessary laws and means to exercise that authority." A list of 29 items of High Commissioner legislation had already been forwarded to the GRI Chief Executive for possible rescission.

Two missions

Before he left Washington, Unger was given "specific instructions." The Department of the Army asked him "to do everything practical to keep the options open for negotiation of Okinawa reversion, and to move as quickly as possible to give Okinawa increased responsibility in self-government," says Priscilla Clapp in her essay on decision-making in Washington on the reversion of Okinawa.¹

Clapp also says: "As High Commissioner, he felt his two basic missions were to maintain peace and security in Asia and to look after the welfare of the Okinawan people. He was particularly aware of the incompatibility of these two missions, realizing that not everything the military might want to do on Okinawa in the name of peace and security was in the best interests of the Okinawan population."

During his tenure, he was constantly under cross fires between an escalating war in Vietnam and local opposition to the stationing of B-52 bombers and port calls of nuclear submarines, in addition to mounting pressure for reversion.

According to Clapp, "High Commissioner Unger spent the majority of his time on political affairs, often as an advocate of political interests over military interests...[and]

found himself doing things and taking positions contrary to his previous experience as a military officer."

He discussed the submarine issue with high-ranking Navy officials (the 7th Fleet Commander, for example) and tried to prevent port calls in times of political unrest in Okinawa. He complained to the Air Force about the frequent visits of B-52's. He canceled additional land acquisition planned for the Army. He also made a series of concessions to the All Military Employees Union.

He was well aware that his first priority was to ensure the viability of the bases; however, in his opinion, the containment of explosive local issues and the enhancement of the welfare of the people were essential to effective military operations. He was often accused, especially by American businesses on Okinawa, of making too many concessions despite the fact that the U.S. still had final authority over the islands.

Unger's method was in direct contrast to that of Lt. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, the third High Commissioner, who literally reigned over "his kingdom" of the Ryukyus and high-handedly carried out whatever he thought was good for the people. Unger's successor, Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert, was a realist, who flatly turned down local requests to negotiate with Washington for the withdrawal of B-52's and who welcomed the port calls of nuclear subs as the Navy scheduled them.

Lampert said: "You just have to remind yourself all of the

time that your first interest is the interest of Uncle Sam and not the interest of these attractive and likeable Okinawan people."² Lampert was extremely busy preparing for reversion, but made a stern distinction between his two missions. He never forgot he was a senior military officer representing the United States. In his view, Unger went too far into civil affairs to make his military mission stand clear of his second, political one.

The Ryukyans

Unger shared the perception of other high commissioners that the Ryukyans were different from mainland Japanese.

"The Okinawans are not ethnic Japanese. As far as I could tell from my study of their origins, they represented a mixture of Caucasian tribes from northern Hokkaido and people from the Islands of the South Pacific," he says in his oral history kept at Carlisle Barracks.³

He then follows the history of the Ryukyus from the time when they formed an independent kingdom to the days after they were incorporated into Japan in 1879, adding that the Okinawans were always looked down upon as "country cousins."

Says Unger: "This is very important to an understanding of what made the Ryukyans act as they did.... Logic had nothing to do with it (how you would handle the problem). A great part of this attitude stemmed from the emotional and deep-rooted feeling of the Ryukyuan people against their so-called brothers in Japan."

According to Unger, the residents of Okinawa had bitter

feelings toward the Japanese because of the latter's "country cousin" attitude toward them, because they blatantly used Okinawa during the Battle to protect mainland Japan, and because Japan relinquished administrative rights over the Ryukyus to the United States to gain its own independence from Allied occupation. "They had contempt for the Japanese because, in turn, the Japanese had contempt [for them]," concludes Unger.

Economic Policy

Although Okinawa's Gross National Product (GNP) expanded at an average annual rate of 10 percent in real terms in the 1955-65 period (at an unprecedented 13 percent in FY1965), the economy was consistently a deficit economy. In FY1967, exports amounted to only \$18 million, while imports were as high as \$365 million. The trade deficit was offset mainly by the American contribution of \$257 million (of which about \$200 was base-related revenues). The American input accounted for about 50% of the Okinawan GNP.

"Even a high school student can understand that this economy cannot long endure without this military input, unless different sources of income are found to replace the goose that lays the golden egg," Unger told members of the American Chamber of Commerce on Okinawa at their luncheon meeting of August 16, 1968.

Unger commissioned an American firm, for a fee of \$200,000 to conduct a study of the Ryukyuan economy, which concluded that the local agriculture must be diversified and that new industry must be

launched by the introduction of foreign investment and new technical know-how to supplement the limited agricultural output. He later emphasized the development of the tourist industry.

"If by some stroke of fate...the military base were materially reduced or withdrawn, the Ryukyuan society would, relatively speaking, rapidly return to a barefoot economy, supported by sweet potatoes and fish," he warned in the same speech.

Despite his effort to restructure the base-dependent economy to make it viable after reversion, local resistance to, or fear of, foreign capital made his economic policy, in his own words, a failure. "...I could never, never, never get the GRI to do what I liked them to," he recalled in an interview with Professor Masahide Ota (later governor of Okinawa) and myself at his Charlottesville, Va. residence on July 26, 1984.

Public Election of the Chief Executive

It was toward the end of his term (November 1968) that the public election of the GRI chief executive was held for the first time, 23 years after the U.S. occupation of Okinawa began. Unger was instrumental in bringing about this election.

The conservative Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, which held a majority of seats in the Ryukyuan Legislature, picked an experienced politician, Junji Nishime, to run against Chobyō Yara, a former teacher and the leader of the powerful Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA), further supported by a

coalition of reformist parties.

Taking his cue from Unger's speech, Nishime campaigned with a warning that a premature reversion and a reduction of the military base would return Okinawa to a "barefoot economy" subsisting on fish and sweet potatoes. Yara advocated an "immediate, unconditional reversion" with a substantial decrease in the U.S. military presence.

Tom Wicker, the columnist, wrote: "Poor Okinawa! Torn between their powerful emotional desire for reversion to Japan and the remorseless forces of world confrontation, its people --- long the playthings of history --- may now be caught in a dilemma that some of its politicians refer to bitterly as 'sweet potatoes or war'" (*New York Times*, May 25, 1969).

Against the wishes of the United States, Yara won the election by a substantial margin, if not by a landslide. In the 1984 interview, Unger said: "I met Yara seven times (after the election). He was quite a gentleman.... I liked

him."

In the first meeting two days after the election, Unger asked Yara whom he would appoint to his "cabinet." Yara made "a gentleman's agreement," assuring Unger that he would not appoint anyone who would "provoke unrest."

Departure

Unger arrived at the Kadena Air Base on November 2, 1966. Outside the base were groups of flag-waving "radicals" protesting his arrival. The following day, at the formal investiture ceremony, an Okinawan minister gave a benediction praying for Unger becoming the last High Commissioner sent to Okinawa.

In his oral history, Unger says: "They [the two events] prophesied the challenge for the next 27 months. It was the challenge that made the task of the High Commissioner the most unique and the most exciting position in either the military or diplomatic service of the United States at that time."

Unger left Okinawa in January 1969.

Endnotes

* Professor emeritus of the University of the Ryukyus, who has recently served as the Director of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives and the Chairman of the Okinawa Prefectural Commission for Resources on Peace.

1. Priscilla Clapp, "Okinawa Reversion: Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington, 1966-1969," in *Okinawa henkan kōshō no sei-ji katei* (The Political Process of Okinawa Reversion Negotiation), edited by the Japanese Association for International Politics (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1975), pp. 29-30.

2. Conversations between Lt. Gen. James Lampert and Col. Harold Miller, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 79.

3. Conversations between Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger and Col. Harold Miller, Senior Officers Debriefing Program (*ibid.*), p. 5.

Publications (XXXII)

We gratefully acknowledge the following gifts of publications, papers and materials.

Bandow, Doug. 1999. "Old Wine in New Bottles. The Pentagon's East Asia Security Strategy Report," **Policy Analysis**, No. 344 (May 18). Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. 20 pp. A critique of the United States' East Asia policy with special reference to the Pentagon report **United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region**, published in late 1998. The main point: there is no justification, other than inertia, for maintaining 100,000 troops in East Asia after so many years after the end of the Cold War. This force level "represents the formidable capabilities of the US Eighth Army and Seventh Air Force in Korea, III Marine Expeditionary Force and Fifth Air Force in Japan, and the US Seventh Fleet, all focused on shaping, responding and preparing as necessary to achieve security and stability in the region" (p. 7). Needed: "a new security architecture that reflects the region's new reality -- the absence of an overwhelming hegemonic threat combined with the opportunity for allied states to construct a local balance of power sufficient to constrain any potential aggressor" (9). Recommendations: Withdraw all ground forces from Korea (p. 10) and Japan in no more than six years, starting with those in Okinawa (p. 12)

Robert V. Hamilton. 1999. "The Futenma Problem," **JPRI Critique**, Vol. VI, Number 5, pp. 1-2. A critique of the perception of the American military presence in Japan (Okinawa) as "a burden on the Japanese (Okinawan) people" which gives rise to a policy dilemma of having to "minimize" that burden while "maintaining the current force levels in Japan (Okinawa)." Evacuation of Futenma merely means moving the marine air station to another location in Okinawa. The "burden" on Okinawa remains the same. Hamilton recalls Japan's traditional policy to segregate

foreign presence and confine it to a small offshore island such as Dejima. The same policy is behind the disproportionate concentration of American military presence in Okinawa which frees the rest of Japan from the "burden" of hosting and living with foreigners.

MacEachin, Douglas J. 1998. **The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-bomb Decision**. Center for the Study of Intelligence. 526 pp. President Truman's concerns about U.S. troop casualties heightened the importance of intelligence about the buildup of Japanese troop strength in various parts of Japan after the Battle of Okinawa. Casualties resulting from that Battle were a factor that helped estimate those from an invasion of Japanese homeland. The high cost of an invasion forced the U.S. to search for less costly alternatives for inducing Japanese surrender. The atomic bombs became available at this time.

Morishima, Michio. 1999. **Naze Nihon wa botsuraku suruka** (Why Japan Will Decline and Fall). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. xii, 205 pp. 1600 yen. Professor Morishima despairs of the quality and potential of today's youth and warns that other things equal, they will bring down Japan in the next 50 years. He notes an extensive devastation of key aspects of Japanese society: morale, finance, industry, and education. To save Japan from ruin, he offers what he calls "the one-and-only means of salvation": Northeast Asian Community. The proposal includes granting independence to Okinawa/Ryukyu and making it the headquarters of the Community.

Nakachi, Kiyoshi. 1997. **Manabi no tabiji: Amerika, Firippin, 1979-86** (Journey of Learning in America and the Philippines, 1979-86). Tokyo: Kindai Bungeisha. 256 pp. 2000 yen. A series of autobiographical essays written at different times in the course of graduate work in the United States and post-doctoral

studies in the Philippines. A great source of inspiration and encouragement for aspiring youth of Okinawa.

Nomoto, Ippei. 1997. **Miyagi Yotoku. Imin seinen gaka no hikari to kage** (Miyagi Yotoku: Light and Shadow of a young emigrant painter). Naha: Okinawa Taimususha. 362 pp. 2500 yen. A life of the talented and much regretted son of Nago, Okinawa: Miyagi Yotoku (1903-1943). He emigrated to the United States as a boy, attended art schools, became a painter, joined the Communist Party, got arrested for involvement in the Sorge spy incident in Japan, and died in the Sugamo prison in Tokyo.

Okinawa International University, Institute of Ryukyuan Culture. 1998. **Nantō Bunka** (Bulletin of the Institute of Ryukyuan Culture), No. 20. 158 pp. 5 articles dealing with archaeology, urban sociology, folklore, medieval language, and classic poetry. The study of medieval language concerns the grammar of the language spoken in the royal palace of Shuri, based on the 18th-century dictionary, *Konkōkenshū*. The title of this document needs an explanation, for it does not sound like a dictionary title.

Okinawa International University, Institute of Ryukyuan Culture. 1998. **Miyako, Hirara-shi chōsa hōkokusho** (3) (Report on the investigations of Miyako Hirara-shi). 137 pp. 6 articles and a reprint of an early postwar document. The articles are on the 1899-1903 land reform, worship of hearth deity, Miyako history, folklore, demographic change, and family history. The reprinted document describes the socioeconomic condition of Miyako in 1946.

Shimabukuro, Jun. 1999.

Riijonarizumu no kokusai hikaku - Seiō to Nihon no jirei kenkyū - (An International Comparison of Regionalism - Case Studies from Western Europe and Japan). Tokyo: Keibundo. iv, 240 pp. Publication of a doctoral dissertation mentioned in *The Ryukyuanist*, No. 43. It enjoys the honor of being the first published doctoral dissertation sponsored by the General Research Institute for Local Self-Government, selected on a competitive basis. Congratulations!

University of Okinawa, Institute of Regional Study. 1999. **Shohō** (Institute Report), No. 19. 88 pp. 500 yen. Articles are mostly on international topics; e.g., ISO certification, Yoshi Hattori's murder in the U.S., peace, Okinawan meat exports, Micronesia.

Zenchūrō Koyō Taisakushitsu. 1999. **Okinawa beigun kichi rōdōsha no shūgyō kōdō to koyō fuan ni kansuru chōsa hōkokusho** (Report on investigations into the jobs and employment insecurity of workers employed at American military bases in Okinawa). Naha. 115 pp. Zenchūrō is short for Zen-chūryūgun Rōdō Kumiai (translated by the Japan Institute of Labor as "All Japan Garrison Forces Labor Union"). A pioneering questionnaire survey of the condition of employment on the US bases in Japan and Okinawa. Employment practices on these bases are reputedly primitive. The jobs are specialized dead-end jobs, though not necessarily unskilled. Training, promotions, and other features of modern human resource management are minimal. In addition to labor market aspects (both internal and external), the survey offers a wealth of information on job satisfaction, worker attitude toward base employment, and other psychological dimensions.

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